Opinion
Aid and interests
Despite much chest-thumping, Indian and Chinese aid efforts have been bumping into each other and neither side has had an easy time helpingRohit Karki
Confounding each other
The reality, however, is slightly different. India and China’s large teams have been bumping into each other in Nepal, and neither side has had an easy time helping, as is to be expected after a disaster of this magnitude. Nepal’s government has struggled in the wake of the country’s worst earthquake in nearly a century, with its officials largely absent from public view. Not so with India and China. Both promised rescuers, sniffer dogs, tents, and food within hours, winning praise from stranded Nepalis. Officials brushed aside talk of a proxy aid war. China’s foreign ministry said on Tuesday that it was willing to “pro-actively coordinate with India on earthquake aid”.
At the same time, news reports of the high-handedness of Indian authorities, such as holding things up at the Nepal airport, mobilising resources to rescue Indian citizens by sending more than 500 Indian buses into Nepali territory, and continuing the domination of India’s relief efforts in Nepal on Indian media. Indian news media have run stories that paint the efforts of other countries in a negative light, such as a story about purported ‘beef masala’ distributed by Pakistan (which Pakistan refuted) and undermining other countries in aid relief. None of this is to suggest that India isn’t doing a great deal, or that aid diplomacy is not a thing. But India’s blatantly triumphal approach might end up backfiring.
A continuing geostrategic rivalry
A geopolitical competition is definitely being reflected in the aid relief and rescue effort. The India-China strategic rivalry has intensified, despite economic engagement between the two. New Delhi’s relations with many of its South Asian neighbours remain fraught, if not hostile. India’s ability to play a more engaged role on the international stage is contingent on its capacity to ensure a degree of stability in its relationships with its South Asian neighbours. China’s growing economic, political, and security footprint in South Asia also complicates India’s dealings with these countries. India’s main objective has been to reassure it neighbours politically, to provide them with the opportunity for deeper engagement economically, and to ensure that the internal politics and policies of these countries do not undermine India’s interests.
China’s growing presence is now being regarded by some South Asian countries as possible strategic leverage vis-à-vis India. If the India-China strategic rivalry matures, this trend of playing China off against India may gain further traction. The emerging pattern of India-China relationship will determine the future of stability in South Asia as a whole and Nepal in particular. Moreover, both India and China are closely monitoring relief and rescue efforts in Nepal and attempting to influence Nepal’s authorities to suit their respective strategic interests.
Additionally, both countries are likely to conduct their aid efforts in Nepal in a manner that will only bolster their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of Nepali citizens. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been proactive in coordinating and sending Indian relief and aid to Nepal. In fact, Prime Minister Sushil Koirala has been reported to have learned of Nepal’s earthquake through one of Modi’s tweets.
Owing to the changing nature of global, regional politics and the perception of each other intentions, there are few possibilities of Nepal being able to ward off external challenges, though they are growing more formidable. Any talk about geostrategy, therefore, involves the identification of major factors contributing to Nepal’s survival and development. The strategic setting of the country has attracted the attention of the region. Whatever happens inside Nepal is of major importance, mainly for its immediate neighbours. China and India’s paramount concern in Nepal is related to security and stability. Any disturbances in Nepal would have spillover impacts on both countries. Similarly, both countries are competing regional powers in Asia and their interest regarding Nepal is to extend their own sphere of influence and contain the other’s. Apart from their economic and trade interests, another common interest for both these countries is to contain superpower influences in the region.
Working trilaterally
In order to manage the increasing strategic and security interests of India and China, Nepali policymakers need to devise pragmatic foreign policy mechanisms. For, trilateral strategic cooperation is something policymakers need to explore as a real option to manage shared strategic Indian and Chinese interests in Nepal. For Nepal, managing the India-China geostrategic rivalry is essential for Nepal’s own peace, stability, and development. For trilateral strategic cooperation to flourish, these three countries need to devise cooperation among each other. They must be committed to dialogue amongst themselves on a wide range of issues and interests. The earthquake aid relief could have been managed in better way had a trilateral mechanism been in place.
Such mechanisms must also be developed to peacefully and amicably resolve differences between individual states or groups of states, including managing the threats of natural disaster. For trilateral strategic cooperation to become a reality, it is imperative that countries develop a sense of a common future and realise that unilateral attempts to safeguard their security may be doomed to failure, as one state’s actions can cause corresponding reactions by another state, undermining the image of both, as seen in the Nepal aid relief efforts.
The geographical location of each country, the porous borders, and the myriad security challenges they face, including growing non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters make it imperative for these countries to frame a trilateral cooperation that will facilitate interaction
between the states and establish an institutional set-up to manage such non-traditional security threats. These three states must continue to be extremely sensitive but are reluctant to share their interests to achieve the common good. This can create problems, because suspicion and mistrust also prevent the creation of an enabling environment.
Trilateral initiatives should not be seen as a zero sum game. Security, however, continues to remain state-centric and the approach to security remains militarist. Issues such as human security are often an area of neglect. Linkages between non-traditional security threats and traditional security need to be developed. This will result in better management of events such as natural disasters and better coordination of aid, relief, and rescue efforts, which are necessary to strengthen cooperation among these three states.
Karki is an assistant professor at the Kathmandu School of Law