Recently, Prime Minister KP Oli left for Bhuj in the Indian state of Gujarat to catch up on the reconstruction following the devastating earthquake that hit the area in 2001. There, he could have seen that the post-quake reconstruction is not only about making things as they were before but also a phase in which big players from outside try to gain influence. Post-earthquake, Gujarat went through economic and structural reforms, but the simple people could not keep up with the rapid change. Even though some organisations have more experience in emergency aid than the government, their reforms are not based on democratic elections. Nepal is now in the same difficult position as Gujarat has been and it must be careful about not repeating the same mistakes. 

An unnatural shift

Disasters leave people and states paralysed, so they are reliant on relief from outside. After the earthquake in Gujarat, big players, such as the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the government of the Netherlands and The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) supplied emergency aid. But they did not just offer help; they took over all the responsibility and set the agenda. Therefore, Gujarat’s reconstruction represented an unnatural shift in the relationship between the state and its people. Well-funded organisations from outside ensured that the state would not receive any responisility or credit.

The shift began just two weeks after the earthquake with the publishing of Needs Assessment reports. The agencies were assigned different tasks: Bilateral donors focused on health awareness and the supply of medical services and emergency preparedness. The WB agreed to lend a quarter of the costs along with the reform and restructuring of urban governance in Gujarat. The ADB focused on housing on the countryside, urban and rural infrastructure, electricity supply, livelihood rehabilitation and multi-hazard disaster mitigation. 

The aid came pouring in, but strings were attached, not only in terms of loan conditions. Gujarat was to be fundamentally changed through its reconstruction. Urban and rural areas were treated distinctly, gender equality and livelihood generation were key issues of intervention, and the development of property and infrastructure was the primary objective of the reconstruction. 

Before the earthquake, Gujarat was the first state in India to be chosen for reforms of the public sector and its integration into the free market economy. The underlying assumption was that a high rate of economic growth should improve employment opportunities and reduce poverty. Institutions offered loans for projects which they believed promoted free market policies and introduced incentives for the private sector to take over activities of the state to reduce its control. 

But the reforms after the earthquake accelerated the process. The victims of the earthquake poorly understood their loan agreements. Rural and urban populations were subjected to differing arrays of new policies and institutions that created much confusion about the new structure of governance. The people were not educated clearly about the new bureaucratic system and it became difficult for them to interact with their own state. People in Kutch—a district of Gujarat—were so frustrated that they campaigned for independence from Gujarat.

Spun narratives

There is a narrative being passed around about how great the Gujarat model of reconstruction could be applied to Nepal. This could be true, but it is important to understand all aspects of the Gujarat reconstruction, not just the positive ones. Years after a disaster, people only remember the narratives spun by those who need to show off their annual reports and impact studies. This is why it is so important for Nepal to tell its own story before someone narratesit for us.

A state in crisis is a prime target for those who want to cash in on its weakness. There is a high risk of exploitation or of the country becoming a clean slate for pushing new agendas. We should analyse the impact of the organisations on Gujarat and how this will shape the future of the state. Democratic institutions transfer power to the people.  When the people disagree with their democratically elected leaders, they can vote them out of office.  People, however, are powerless against international development institutions. Such organisations are anything but democratic. Yet, when elected leaders sign agreements, their loan agreements bind the state regardless of what happens during the next election cycle. Just ask Greece or Brazil. The people most affected by the policies of foreign banks have no say in their leadership or policies.  Ironically, these are the same institutions that provide the very metrics of development within countries like Nepal.

Thapa is a researcher at Southasian Institute of Advanced Studies