The market today is awash with books related to the Maoist insurgency. For the past decade, the conflict has served as a great fodder for employment and consultancy contacts for the oft-lauded experts in the field of conflict resolution and peace building. Even Nepali movies have not been spared, borrowing heavily from themes of the conflict, however shallow those themes maybe. It, however, is still difficult to find information related to the decade-long Maoist insurgency, particularly, on their inner workings of the Maoist party’s military organisation and operation. It is still rare to find a book or a research delving on how the Maoists raised funds and other resources to wage a war against the state, even if such inside information would be extremely useful in understanding, as well as predicting and mitigating the consequences of this and possible future conflicts.

Chacha: Journey of Struggle of Bhaktiprasad Pandey is now available in the market. The posthumously published book detailing the life of Bhaktiprasad Pandey provides insights into how the Maoists procured arms and ammunition and other required materials during their insurgency. Pandey was tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the Supply Department within the party during the war and his job involved the covert procurement, security, transport and distribution of materials, arms, bullets, gelatines, satellite phones to various parts of Nepal. Given that he had to operate clandestinely—in black markets, with smugglers—the inside information presented in the book, thus, serves as an eye-opener on the arms market in South Asia. Out of the 21 crisp chapters, spread over 179 pages, the reader will find six chapters devoted to his “supply business”. Remaining materials are related to his political career and the Maoists’ infighting and disarray.

The brief visit on the workings of demand and supply in the black markets for arms and ammunition, volatility in pricing, locating the source of materials, the risks associated with transporting and distributing of the procured materials, provide revealing insights on how corruption in the bureaucracy and in the police and the army—both in India and Nepal—helped fuel and sustain the People’s War in Nepal. Though the Maoists also procured illegal materials from the autonomous region of Tibet in China, the chunk of its war materials came from India. The open, free and largely unregulated 1700 km long border in the South may have helped to ease the supply of war materials from India to Nepal, and it was the various insurgency movements in North India that served as the primary source for the materials. For small arms Bihar and UP provided an easy access; the coal mines in Bihar provided raw materials for explosives. However, with the escalation of the insurgency after direct confrontation with the then Royal Nepal Army, the Maoists had to look for bigger suppliers and willing markets were accessible in the North-East Indian states like Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, and even through insurgents from Myanmar. As the many conflicts in the region raged on, it even became tempting for some members of even the Indian army to make quick money through the sale of bullets and weapons.

In one section, Pandey writes that even state governments in India were directly engaged in supplying arms and ammunitions in the black market. He has this reason to give: In the short run it may look absurd to see the state promoting the black market for arms and ammunitions which ultimately get into the hands of the insurgents who are fighting against the state itself. However, in the long run, by inferring from the quantity of arms demanded, the state gets to know in advance the scale of assaults going to take place and the arms going to be used in their strike. By making insurgents dependent on the state supplied of weapons, it can also trick the insurgents by supplying fake bullets. Initially, the state lures the insurgents by supplying real bullets in smaller quantities when it comes to larger quantities either fake bullets are supplied or but real bullets boiled in the water (to make them non-functional) are supplied in the market, through dealers. The supply of fake bullets is done to disrupt relationships or inflict distrust between the insurgents and arms smugglers. With regards to price of the weapons, Pandey confirms, there are no fixed prices. Since one is into highly risky illegal business, the name of the game is swift conclusion of the business transactions.

Once the weapons of war were procured, spare tires, secret chambers and cavities in vehicles and trucks ferrying coal into Nepal seem to have been the popular mode of transporting the weapons into the country. As security personnel at the check points do not like to get dirty, truckloads of coal became the easiest mode for transport, particularly if the consignment included a huge cache of weapons. At one instance, writes Pandey (128p), the rebels managed to sneak in a large quantity of gelatine from India after offering INRs 50,000 in bribes to members of the Indian Police. The money not only helped keep away the inspecting eye of the authorities; it also provided full police security till the material got delivered to the border check point in Nepal.

Pandey also explains how the arm-supplying governments reap double benefits from the insurgent movements. They supply little quantity of arms to the rebels and engage in supplying huge quantity of arms trade with the government the rebels are fighting against. This is how, according to Pandey, conflicts are sustained. All in all, with insights like these and with tell-all details from the inner workings of the Maoist party during the insurgency, Chacha makes for a fascinating and an engaging read, one that might serve as an important marker for students of history and the oft-lauded experts in conflict management alike.