Opinion
State of crisis
Nepal’s human rights champions have lost credibility by choosing to selectively question the Human Rights Watch Report and voicing their understandable rage against India’s undeclared blockade without mentioning state brutalityPramod Mishra
PM Oli shocked the world by appointing six deputy prime-ministers. This unprecedented and ludicrous move reveals the deep-rooted structure of the present conflict—loss of credibility, the resultant crisis of the Nepali state and the battle over its control. Nepal’s ultranationalists bristle that India wants to control the country. Given the history of Nepal with both colonial and postcolonial India, India might have a different notion of Nepal’s sovereignty. Otherwise, Nepali leaders would neither fly to New Delhi for all and sundry reasons to consult the South Block or run to the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, and nor would India’s special envoys and agents try to micromanage Nepali affairs. India’s security concerns because of the open border it shares with Nepal is legitimate given Pakistan’s continued hostility and rise of Islamic jihadism there and the rise of China as a dominant power in Asia. Internally, the crisis stems from the desparate attempt of the ultranationalist hill caste Hindus to sustain their hold on state power even while losing all credibility to do so and the challenge posed by the excluded.
Media and NGOs at fault
The three branches of the state along with the media and the NGOs—various human rights organisations—that judge wrong from right all suffer from a severe credibility deficit.
Kamal Thapa quite ably presented his government’s perspective at the Universal Periodic Review session in Geneva without mentioning a word about the killings in Madhes. Thapa is the prime accused for using excessive force in the two People’s Movements of 1990 and 2006, as mentioned in Mallik and Rayamajhi Commissions. The absence of a proper debate and active participation of the Constituent Assembly (CA) members dominated as they were by party bosses diminished the credibility of the CA. Similarly, Nepal’s human rights champions have also lost credibility by choosing to selectively question the Human Rights Watch Report and voicing their understandable rage against India’s undeclared blockade without mentioning Nepali state’s brutalisation and killing of Madhesis and Tharus, which is quite baffling.
And then we have the media men. These, too, in the guise of defending the nation against India write editorials and articles ably documenting India’s explicit and clandestine tactics to micromanage Nepal’s affairs but fail to effectively question the Nepali state’s discriminations and document its excesses and violence on Tharus and Madhesis.
Public spaces in Nepal—just like the political parties that have become a tool of the traditional occupiers of the state to manage the diverse population by offering tickets in elections and economic opportunities by other means (ie employment in state agencies), but not voice the systemic discriminations of the Nepali state against their communities and the direct branches of the government—have become sites to promote the established hegemony of the traditional castes in the guise of ultra-nationalism. And, then there is the hate brigade of young and educated Nepali-speaking folks with access to social media. In the recent election in Bihar, journalists found that a Bihari supporting the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party was over 90 percent likely to be an upper-caste man. The same way, when you read an ethnic slur hurled at Madhesis or Indians, you can be certain that the man doing so to have a hill caste name.
What is to be done?
Thankfully, people of all ethnicities are speaking out against this battalion of hate and fear-mongering ultranationalists while the Madhesis and Tharus are waging a struggle for justice and an equal share in the state. But both the Madhesis and India have to ask themselves if the blockade is the effective way to force the occupiers of the Nepali state to concede equal rights to marginalised communities. It seems as though the ultranationalists in control of the Nepali state would rather destroy the country than give in to the just demands of the Madhesis. The prime minister himself has used dehumanising epithets against the Madhesis; his security forces have used ethnic slurs when raiding their homes in Bhardaha, Siraha and the hate brigade of Nepali-speaking youth uses ethnic slurs all the time on social media. And the YouTube videos of police beatings and fatal shootings demonstrate that these people, whether in government or outside, have lost all credibility. This loss of credibility of the ruling group is the biggest crisis Nepal is facing right now. On the other hand, the laudable achievement of the Madhes movement is its rejection of violence against hill caste people.
Therefore, the justice seekers in Nepal have their work cut out for them. They would have to get ready for the long haul while pushing the short-term strategies. And India needs to rethink its strategies in Nepal by adopting a more mature approach. An immediate lesson could be Bihar’s recent election: form a grand alliance among all marginalised groups, including the multilingual, multicultural champions from among the Nepali-speaking hill caste folks to defeat the hate-mongering, fear-mongering, power-hugging ultranationalists. But at any cost, do not destroy Nepal; save it for the future generation.