Nepal-India relations continue to be in the limelight. The relations transcend all dimensions of both the symbol and substance of a geographically circumscribed nation state. Any major domestic development in Nepal has its externalities, making foreign policy an extension of its internal politics. Today, Nepal-India relationship is in focus following the creation of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to look into the entire gamut of bilateral relations between the two countries. This idea was mooted by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Nepal in August 2014 to give a new lease of life to mutual cooperation between the two nations.

However, Nepal’s public discourse today seems to have bogged down on the structure of Nepal-India relationship as underpinned by the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, as though other issues between the two countries are less significant. Although the two sides had agreed to review the treaty during Prime Minister Manmohan Adhikari’s official visit to India in 1995—something that was repeatedly agreed by the succeeding governments—nothing concrete has come out of such commitments. All Nepali governments that were headed by the critics of the treaty as well as others vowed to examine the relevance/irrelevance of it. But even those that almost launched anti-treaty campaigns for their own internal political gains have not given clear directions to the bilateral relation.

Coordination problem

There are three Nepali approaches to the 1950 Treaty. First, the diehard critics of the so-called “unequal treaty” are hell-bent on abrogating it in order to fit into the spirit of “national independence and sovereignty” and freedom of independent action accruing to a sovereign nation-state. Surprisingly, however, these critics do not have alternatives to the treaty nor have they done any homework on multiple aspects of Nepal-India bilateral relations. If such a step is taken without taking into account the geo-political, social, economic, human, strategic and political realities, the abrogation of the treaty would only open a Pandora’s box at a time when Nepal’s internal politics is unstable. Even the constitution promulgated by the Constituent Assembly is being questioned on the grounds of inclusiveness and creation of federal units. India has been dragged into the domestic controversy, making it an important plank of bilateral relations.

For abrogating the treaty, there needs to be cooperation and coordinated feelings between both the countries, because the circumstances that will follow without cooperative foreign policy and without India’s willingness to abrogate the treaty are neither desirable nor beneficial to the greater cause of Nepal. Inter-state relations are not always regulated by treaty provisions, nor are principles enunciated by international community followed by the practitioners of relations. So while revaluating Nepal-India relations, both sides should agree to weigh the pluses and minuses for the two countries. Foreign policy, particularly concerning our two neighbours, China and India, cannot be determined by slogans and xenophobia as we have observed in the past. People-centric developmental programmes and areas of empowerment of common citizens must be enhanced to promote the agenda of rashtriyata, which is not necessarily anti-Indian in orientation.  

The deconstructionist approach taken by Nepal unilaterally will have serious repercussions ifIndia goes against it. Nepali political elites know the consequences of such a move and have not gathered courage to nullify the treaty provisions without India’s consent.

Haste makes waste

Second, review and readjustment is another approach to deal with the treaty. But this too needs a framework of policy that helps promote the spirit of mutual trust and benefits. The Nepali side should be clear on which parts of the treaty need to be reviewed or amended. There is a possibility that if the changes are made without taking various factors into consideration, such as people-to-people relations or even the open border arrangements among others, such a venture would not go unchallenged. At a time when the country is in dire need of political stability, peace and development, such changes might not be beneficial for the country.

The third approach relates to the continuity of the status quo—neither abrogation nor review of the treaty. Unless a thorough study is conducted on various aspects of the treaty, no hasty decision should be made. First, the house should be in order by forging a broad national consensus on the issue. Indian nationals have also started asking questions about the comparative advantages of the treaty for them.   

Cross-country migrations, economic benefits accruing to Nepali nationals in India and other special arrangements made in trade and other sectors would be disturbed if both the countries decide to go for Most Favoured Nation (MFN) arrangements. Myron Weiner, the internationally recognised American political scientist, once wrote that India is a “safety-valve” for Nepal because of the employment opportunities gained by Nepalis in India. Though it is not a one-way traffic and Indians too are receiving benefits on the basis of structural and non-structural arrangements, the extent of damage to be inflicted on Nepal would be greater than for India if these arrangements are to break.

Face the realities

The creation of the EPG is not the right approach to go into the depth of Indo-Nepal relations. It would have been much better had the two countries given the task of examining the entire state of Indo-Nepal relations to research centres or individual experts. A prominent journalist, Dhruba Hari Adhikari, has also suggested that a no-treaty regime can continue for some time on the basis of other bilateral arrangements, and then a new treaty could be concluded after Nepal’s internal conditions stabilise. In his opinion, the EPG is only a waste of time and money. First, Nepal should formulate a sound policy and only then work on the reformulation of the treaty.

Some old clichés about Nepal’s neighbourhood policies need to be revisited. The concept of Nepal as a yam between two boulders is not appropriate as the country has moved beyond the two countries’ borders despite Nepal’s overdependence on India. Similarly, the “equidistant policy” between China and India is a misnomer as the extensive relations with the southern neighbour cannot be equated to those with China. Chinese leaders, including late Mao, have recognised our geographical position and are  believed to have advised Nepali leaders to be close to India without harming China’s vital interests. Nepal’s strained relations with India in 1989 and 2015-16 precipitated by the obstruction at the  border entry points,  popularly described as India’s “undeclared blockade”, and Nepal’s hope to use China as an alternative to India for supply of essential commodities, particularly petroleum products, have compelled us to be realistic in our neighbourly relations. For geography continues to be revengeful even in the 21st century. Gone are the days of confrontational approaches to inter-state relations or the use of “cards”, or playing one neighbour against the other.

Baral is a professor and former ambassador of Nepal to India