Opinion
Clash of giants
If the standoff between China and India at Doklam on the China-India-Bhutan tri-junction is any indication, the chance of the 21st century becoming the Asian Century is slim.Achyut Wagle
If the standoff between China and India at Doklam on the China-India-Bhutan tri-junction is any indication, the chance of the 21st century becoming the Asian Century is slim. In 2006, Harvard historian Niall Ferguson wrote that the bloody 20th century witnessed ‘the descent of the West’ and ‘a reorientation of the world’ toward the East. He foresaw a declining United States and a rapid ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centred world order. The idea of an Asian Century naturally enthralled the impoverished countries of South and East Asia. Theories of demographic dividends and abundance of natural resources raised their hopes for prosperity and a better livelihood. But these aspirations may be crushed in the battle between two powerful countries.
In the Doklam imbroglio, Bhutan serves as the ‘classic’ example of such a predicament. Everybody is focused on what China or India wants, and nobody asks what Bhutan wants. Nor is there a circumstance that could enable it to express its true desire amid the geopolitical duress. Likewise, Nepal, with its own ambition of being a bridge between China and India, now seems to be inescapably trapped by their war of ascertaining strategic control in the region.
Steady advances
Lately, regardless of Doklam, Chinese aggressiveness has become strikingly evident on all four fronts—frontline, diplomacy, publicity and mercantilism. Despite international resistance, China reportedly deployed a fleet of sophisticated submarine drones in the South China Sea. Refusing to pull back from Doklam, a Chinese military spokesperson threatened India last week saying, “Moving a mountain is easier than shaking the People’s Liberation Army.” The PLA also warned against making a fresh advance into the contested Kashmir region.
China has tried to convince the global diplomatic community that the part of Doklam where China plans to construct a connecting road is its territory. Chinese diplomats sit at the table with a bulky file of maps and historical bilateral treaties to drive their point home. China poured cold water on Indian expectations that the recent visit of National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to Beijing would help to thaw relations. The official media in Beijing had pre-emptively declared that no such deal was possible during the visit.
Chinese scrutiny is so meticulous that official media outlets used many words to criticise Delhi-based India Today magazine that had allegedly omitted Taiwan and Tibet from the map of China on its cover. The Chinese social media outcry over the issue was massive. Similar media campaigns are common on other issues of Chinese one-upmanship including the South China Sea.
China’s mercantilist craftsmanship is historically unparalleled. With President Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and increased financial resources at its disposal, China is now out to buy the world. Just last weekend, a Chinese state-owned company lease purchased Sri Lanka’s deep sea port of Hambantota for 99 years along with 15,000 acres of land nearby to use as an industrial hub for $1.1 billion. The port that looks to Africa and West Asia is a great strategic acquisition to execute and extend the ambitious BRI.
Limitations of power
Although Sri Lankan (not Chinese) authorities tried to allay Indian security concerns over the deal, no country knows better than India how the East India Company entered as a trader and ruled the entire country for more than two centuries. Unfortunately, India could have done very little to stop the Sino-Lankan port deal even if it wanted to. If this new Chinese advancement is viewed in conjunction with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its preparedness to extend land routes across the Tibetan plateau, like in Doklam, it is not difficult to conclude that the Chinese strategy to circumscribe India is materialising far sooner than generally thought.
Some emerging ground realities, too, are crucial here. Internationally, India is seen as an American ally. But the Trump administration is so preoccupied with its own foreign policy mess and its overtly inward orientation that even professed US allies have been left in the lurch. Meanwhile, a new-found Sino-Russian alliance that resulted in a joint sea drill in the Mediterranean has created a strategic shift in the international power balance. India perhaps failed to feel the pulse of her traditional ally Russia which will have immense repercussions in the not so distant future.
The financial, military and other resources that India currently has are in no way comparable to those of China. Therefore, the Indian strategy of countering or competing with China is more likely to face a CPEC or Hambantota-like backlash. Despite India’s willingness to keep the sphere of regional influence intact, it has not even tried to take its closest neighbours into confidence, particularly on issues like Doklam. China, too, is employing the tools of ‘luring or threatening’ the neighbours instead of engaging them in due diplomatic process.
For Nepal, there is nothing to like or dislike in these developments. But it will be difficult for Nepal to maintain the so-called foreign policy of equidistance between India and China if tensions between the two continue to escalate. In the larger context, the dream of an Asian Century will surely not materialise, even partially, unless these great powers decide to cooperate at least with regard to regional stability and economic interest.
Wagle, a founding editor of the economic daily Arthik Abhiyan, is an eco-political analyst