Opinion
An ode to governance
The Constitution has to be amended to re-engineer the subpar multi-party parliamentary systemWe are said to be in a post-truth era, and so it is understandable that the donor community is eager for Nepal to stay under the watch of the Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority (CIAA). However, the recent controversies surrounding the CIAA have shown that the institution is not manned by people with integrity and professionalism who are chosen on merit. The CIAA also is not in a position to deal with breaches of the law, since it lacks critical institutional independence from the government. The CIAA was deemed necessary to stop the present rot in the body politic, but it did not prove to be a panacea for the moral decay of society.
Changes have to be made to the Constitution so as to re-engineer the nature and style of the multi-party parliamentary system. This has to be done with a view to garner a judicious balance between the concepts of ‘people’s sovereignty’ and
‘parliamentary sovereignty’ that were so uniquely envisioned by the founding fathers of Nepal’s Constitution.
For the public
Let us ask ourselves this question once more: why should the Constitution be amended? Consider the simple formula propounded by the donor community, namely that ‘good governance’ (GG) equals ‘good politics’ (GP) plus ‘good civil service’ (GCS). Hence for simplicity: GG=GP+GCS.
Experience tells us compellingly that electoral politics based on competition has not led to good party behaviour as the opposition refuse to allow the ‘winner-to-take-all’. Instead, the opposition resort to unethical extra-parliamentary politics on the streets to have their say. Of course, having an Act to regulate political parties’ funding, auditing, governance etc. is a theoretical possibility, but who will enforce such an Act?
Developments through time have shown that all Members of Parliament (MPs) wish to be ministers someday, hence the proclivity for jumbo Cabinets with minimal concern for the separation of powers between the Executive and Legislature, lack of frugality in the use of tax payers’ hard earned money, and nominal accountability for cost-effectiveness.
Experience tells us that MPs do not wish to spend time on the art of ‘law making’ and ‘monitoring the laws’ for the good of the public, but rather would like to delve into day-to-day district development matters contrary to the letter and spirit of decentralisation.
Finally, experience tells us that even with a majority in Parliament, there is an undercurrent of political instability as parties are personality-directed rather than ideology-based or action-oriented. Each party is further divided into different factions, resulting in intra-party conflicts. It is, therefore, advisable to undertake four constitutional changes.
Necessary steps
First, disallow MPs from becoming ministers. Let the prime minister from the ruling political party appoint anyone he wishes as minister, provided the person is not a parliamentarian. The sole duty of the MP, once elected, is to govern—not play party politics. The MP can govern by debating and framing laws; making ministers accountable; constantly visiting his or her constituency to obtain and render the voice of his or her constituency in Parliament; and projecting the decisions of Parliament into his or her Party for catalysing national consensus, and providing constructive criticism with alternative courses of action so as to move governmental policies forward as MP. The proposed approach would make the Upper House redundant.
However, if this is too much reform, then an alternative is to reconstitute the present Upper House and make it a source of countervailing authority that is given to a longer-term vision than those in the Lower House. The Upper House should, on the one hand, be truly representative of the very plurality of our nation with respect to gender, ethnicity, religion and language, and on the other hand allow a platform for the voices of civil society by electing them into the Upper House on the basis of their status as national associations of professional organisations, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, trade unions, cooperatives, business federations etc. Thus they could contribute to law-making and national policy debates by representing non-partisan or non-ideological interests.
An Upper House that replicates the Lower House is in dire need of reform, especially when it is serving as a repository of failed politicians who have lost their elections into the Lower House.
Second, have a clear-cut demarcation of functions and powers between the ministries and departments. Only those institutions that are mandated by acts of Parliament should be set up as departments within ministries. Each department should be accountable to Parliament for the attainment of its goals and objectives as enunciated in its governing act. Each department should also be liable to performance audits by Parliament for their rationale and impact on the rule of law and good governance.
Third, empower the constitutional organs of state like the Supreme Court, the CIAA, Auditor General’s Office, Election Commission, and Public Service Commission so all executive appointments are made by the government upon the recommendation of independent authorities duly established for all public service appointments serving as fixed-term chief executive officers.
Finally, the heads of the constitutional organs of state should be subject to impeachment by Parliament and have their own public servants that are independent of the civil service cadre. Their budgets should be voted for two years at a time directly by the Parliament based on their own demands for it. In short, these organs should not be beholden to the MoF for their financial resources, nor the Ministry of General Administration (MoGA) for personnel resources and human resources policies.
Rana is the former finance minister of Nepal; Thakur is a New Delhi-based public policy professional and columnist. They can be reached on: [email protected]